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Comments
The Right to Independent Testing:
Boon for Defendant-Burden for
Prosecution?
The trial of a criminal case is not a game of fox and hounds
in which the State attempts to outwit and trap a quarry. It is,
instead, a sober search for the truth, in which not only the
resources of the defendant, but those of the State, must be
put to work in aid of that search.'
INTRODUCTION
Most jurisdictions2 recognize the criminal3 defendant's right
to test independently evidentiary samples in the state's posses-
, Garcia v. District Court, 589 P.2d 924, 930 (Colo. 1979) (en banc) (citing Giles
v. Maryland, 386 U.S. 66, 98 (1967) (Fortas, J., concurring)).
See, e.g., Warren v. State, 288 So. 2d 826, 830-31 (Ala. 1973); Lee v. State,
511 P.2d 1076, 1077 (Alaska 1973); Rogers v. Municipal Court, 531 S.W.2d 257, 258
(Ark. 1976); People v. Garries, 645 P.2d 1306, 1309 (Colo. 1982); State v. Clemons,
363 A.2d 33, 38 (Conn.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 855 (1975); Deberry v. State, 457 A.2d
744, 751-52 (Del. 1983); Lee v. U.S., 385 A.2d 159, 163 (D.C. 1978); Stipp v. State,
371 So. 2d 712 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979), cert. denied, 383 So. 2d 1203 (Fla. 1980);
People v. Taylor, 369 N.E.2d 573, 576 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977); State v. Brown, 337 N.W.2d
507, 510 (Iowa 1983); James v. Commonwealth, 482 S.W.2d 92, 93-94 (Ky. 1972); State
v. Cloutier, 302 A.2d 84, 89 (Me. 1973); Commonwealth v. Walker, 441 N.E.2d 261,
263 (Mass. App. Ct. 1982); State v. Carlson, 267 N.W.2d 170, 175 (Minn. 1978); Love
v. State, 441 So. 2d 1353, 1354 (Miss. 1983); Talancon v. State, 621 P.2d 1111, 1112
(Nev. 1981); State v. Berry, 470 A.2d 881, 885 (N.H. 1983); State v. Lovato, 617 P.2d
169, 171 (N.M. Ct. App. 1980); People v. White, 390 N.Y.S.2d 405, 406 (N.Y. 1976);
State v. Kersting, 623 P.2d 1095, 1103 (Or. Ct. App. 1981), aff'd, 638 P.2d 1145 (Or.
1982); Commonwealth v. Arenella, 452 A.2d 243, 245-47 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982); State
v. Faraone, 425 A.2d 523, 525-26 (R.I. 1981); State v. Hanson, 278 N.W.2d 198, 200
(S.D. 1979); Latham v. State, 560 S.W.2d 410, 411-412 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1978);
Detmering v. State, 481 S.W.2d 863, 864 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972); State v. Vaster, 659
P.2d 528, 531 (Wash. 1983) (en banc); State v. McCardle, 194 S.E.2d 174, 178-79 (W.
Va. 1973); State v. Bailey, 475 A.2d 1045, 1049-50 (Vt. 1984). See also United States v.
Doty, 714 F.2d 761, 764-65 (8th Cir. 1983); United States v. Baca, 687 F.2d 1356, 1359-
60 (10th Cir. 1982); United States v. Traylor, 656 F.2d 1326, 1334-35 (9th Cir. 1981);
Virgin Islands v. Testamark, 570 F.2d 1162, 1165-66 (3d Cir. 1978); United States v.
Herndon, 536 F.2d 1027, 1029 (5th Cir. 1976), wherein the federal circuit courts have
also recognized this right. Contra State v. Lightle, 502 P.2d 834, 836 (Kan. 1972), cert.
denied, 410 U.S. 941 (1973); State v. Kaye, 423 A.2d 1002, 1005-06 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1980), cert. denied, 434 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1981).
' Under common law, the criminal defendant had no right to pretrial discovery
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sion.4 The right to test is presently embodied in state5 and
federal6 discovery rules-an outgrowth of Supreme Court deci-
sions that recognize the prosecution's duty to disclose certain
materials to the defense where non-disclosure would violate con-
stitutional guarantees of due process. 7 The accused's right to test
physical evidence that the state intends to subject to destructive
scientific analysis, however, is a unique issue, and has been the
or inspection. 2 F. WHARTON, CRIINAL EVIDENCE, § 671 (12th ed. 1955). The extent of
a criminal defendant's discovery rights has been a continuing source of controversy. See
generally Brennan, The Criminal Prosecution: Sporting Event or Quest for Truth?, 1963
WASH. U.L.Q. 279 (1963); Fletcher, Pretrial Discovery in State Criminal Cases, 12 STAN.
L. REV. 293 (1959-60); Ginsburg, Disclosure to the Defense in a Criminal Case, 57 ILL.
B.J. 194 (1968-69); Traynor, Grounds Lost and Found in Criminal Discovery, 39
N.Y.U.L. REV. 228 (1964); Note, The Prosecutor's Constitutional Duty to Reveal
Evidence to the Defendant, 74 YALE L.J. 136 (1964-65).
4 Although various types of physical evidence gathered by the government are
submitted to destructive testing, the cases cited in this Comment deal primarily with
chemical tests on alleged narcotics or body substances. Cases involving breath samples
are specifically excluded from this Comment. See note 25 infra.
Most state discovery rules provide for inspection of "tangible objects." Some
courts have interpreted their discovery rules to encompass disclosure of physical evidence
for independent testing. See, e.g., 457 A.2d at 751 (construing DEL SUPER. CT. CRIM.
R. 16(b)); 371 So. 2d at 713 (construing FLA. R. Clm P. 3.220(a)(l)(vi)); 302 A.2d at
87 (construing ME. R. CPmi. P. 16(a)); 452 A.2d at 245-46 (construing PA. R. CPrit. P.
310); 425 A.2d at 526 (construing R.I. R. CRsut. P. 16(a)(5)); 475 A.2d at 1049 (construing
VT. R. Ca~i. P. 16(b)(2)). See also ALA. R. CaRm. P. 18.1(c) (defendant may inspect
documents and tangible objects); AIZ. R. CP.i. P. 15.1(a)-(c) (providing that certain
evidence be made available to the defendant for testing); IowA R. CRIhi. P. 13(2)(b)(1)
(permitting the defendant to conduct scientific tests on items seized by the state in
connection with the alleged crime); MINN. R. CRiu. P. 9.01(l)(3) (prosecutor may be
required to permit defendant to test relevant material); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-1913 (1979)
(prosecutor may be required to make evidence available for independent testing when
state's evidence consists of scientific tests); Wis. R. CRi. P. 971.23(5) (defendant may
obtain production of physical evidence for scientific analysis when state will offer
physical evidence at trial).
6 FED. R. Ciam. P. 16(a)(1)(C) provides for disclosure of tangible objects "within
the possession, custody or control of the government." The government's duty to disclose
is mandatory if the requested item is material to the preparation of the defense, or.is
intended for use by the government as evidence in chief at trial, or was obtained from
or belongs to the defendant. See C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE:
CRIMtiNAL 2D § 254 (1982); 8 MoORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE J 16.05(4) (2d ed. 1984). See
also 8 MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE J 16.05(3) (pretrial discovery under FED. R. CRIi.
P. 16 (a)(1)(D) enables defendant to conduct independent tests).
I See, e.g., United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 108-14 (1976) (prosecution has
constitutional duty to disclose exculpatory evidence that would raise a reasonable doubt
about defendant's guilt); Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 153-55 (1972) (prose-
cution must reveal plea bargaining agreement with key government witness); Napue v.
Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269-72 (1959) (government's knowing use of perjured testimony
without disclosure to the defendant violates due process).
RIGHT TO INDEPENDENT TESTING
subject of much debate.8 This Comment compares Kentucky's
response to the issue, in Green v. Commonwealth,9 with other
jurisdictions. Additionally, a procedural rule is proposed for
Kentucky which, unlike the narrow ruling in Green, would fully
protect the needs of both prosecution and defense.
I. CONSTITUTIONAL PRECEDENTS
In Brady v. Maryland,0 the Supreme Court established the
principle that prosecutorial withholding of exculpatory evidence
violates due process, regardless of good or bad faith on the part
of the prosecution." The nondisclosed evidence in Brady, how-
ever, was still in existence,' 2 and its exculpatory value easily
ascertained.
United States v. Bryant3 was the first decision to extend the
"Brady doctrine" to the nonpreservation of clearly discoverable
physical evidence. In Bryant, the evidence the defense sought
was mysteriously lost, 14 making its exculpatory value impossible
to determine. The court ultimately found that the Brady due
process requirement governed not only nondisclosure by failure
to reveal, but also nondisclosure due to nonpreservation. 1 Fur-
thermore, the court imposed a duty on the government to pre-
serve all discoverable evidence,' 6 including evidence that " 'might'
be 'favorable' to the accused.' ' 1
7
While the "Brady doctrine" is now well-settled concerning
evidence withheld, its application to nonpreservation cases re-
See generally Note, Destruction of Criminal Evidence, 23 ARIZ. L. REv. 460
(1981); Note, The Right to Independent Testing: A New Hitch in the Preservation of
Evidence Doctrine, 75 COLUti. L. Rv. 1355 (1975); Comment, Criminal Procedure-
Preservation of Due Process When Evidence is Destroyed or Tested-State v. Wright,
53 WASH. L. REv. 573 (1977-78); Comment, Judicial Response to Governmental Loss
or Destruction of Evidence, 39 U. Cm. L. Rv. 542 (1971-72).
684 S.W.2d 13 (Ky. Ct. App. 1984).
373 U.S. 83 (1963).
Id. at 87. Exculpatory evidence was held to be that which "is material either to
guilt or to punishment." Id.
11 Id. at 84. The prosecution failed to disclose that the defendant's companion
had confessed to the murder with which the defendant was charged. Id.
" 439 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
14 Id. at 644. The evidence consisted of a tape containing recorded conversations
made prior to and during an alleged drug sale. Id. at 645.
1 Id. at 648.
Id. at 652.
Id. at 652 n. 21 (citation omitted).
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mains unclear. 8 Some courts have found that due process guar-
antees are implicated when the government destroys potentially
exculpatory evidence during the course of its own testing.' 9 Other
courts have flatly refused to extend Brady to cases of nonpres-
ervation absent actual governmental suppression.
20
The Supreme Court finally attempted to address the non-
preservation issue in California v. Trombetta.2' Noting its own
lack of guidance concerning the scope of the government's duty
to preserve evidence, the Court recognized "the difficulty of
developing rules to deal with evidence destroyed through prose-
cutorial neglect or oversight. 2 2 The Court limited the govern-
ment's duty of preservation "to evidence that might be expected
to play a significant role in the suspect's defense.''23 This elusive
concept was further defined to require preservation of evidence
that possesses an exculpatory value that is apparent before its
destruction and is of such a nature that the defendant could not
reasonably obtain access to comparable evidence.2
It is unlikely that the Trombetta decision, alone, will dispel
the uncertainty that plagues courts on the preservation issueY
Is The U.S. Supreme Court has never expressly held that nonpreservation of
evidence, absent suppression, violates due process. State v. Berry, 470 A.2d 881, 885
(N.H. 1983).
," See id. See also State v. Lovato, 617 P.2d 169, 171 (N.M. Ct. App. 1930); State
v. Hanson, 278 N.W.2d 198, 200 (S.D. 1979); State v. Bailey, 475 A.2d 1045, 1050 (Vt.
1984); State v. Wright, 557 P.2d 1, 4 (Wash. 1976).
20 See Lee v. State, 511 P.2d 1076, 1077 (Alaska 1973); State v. Herrera, 365 So.
2d 399, 401 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978), cert. denied, 373 So. 2d 459 (Fla. 1979); State
v. Pearson, 678 P.2d 605, 615 (Kan. 1984); State v. Carlson, 267 N.W.2d 170, 175
(Minn. 1978); Poole v. State, 291 So. 2d 723, 726 (Miss.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1019
(1974).
2- 104 S. Ct. 2528 (1984).
11 Id. at 2533. The difficulties arise when potentially exculpatory evidence is
destroyed and courts must undertake the "treacherous task" of determining whether the
destroyed evidence would have proven favorable to the defendant. Id.
Id. at 2534.
24 Id.
21 The holding in Trombetta is extremely narrow. Justice Marshall, writing for the
Court, held that due process guarantees do not mandate that states preserve breath
samples of suspected drunk drivers to admit the test results at trial. Id. at 2535. In
reaching this holding, the Court noted several factors that distinguish the reliability of
breathalyzer tests from other tests. First, there is the extreme unlikelihood that a
preserved breath sample would prove exculpatory. To ensure accurate results, the Cali-
fornia testing procedure requires two independent measurements that must correlate for
test results to be admissible. Id. at 2534. To guarantee the machine is working properly,
defendants are given an opportunity to inspect the machine used to test their breath as
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This uncertainty in constitutional analysis may explain why many
state courts rely on their own constitutional and statutory safe-
guards when determining whether a defendant's rights have been
violated.
26
II. NECESSARY VS. UNNECESSARY DESTRUCTION
When the state exhausts evidence through testing, most ju-
risdictions permitting independent testing by a defendant draw
a sharp distinction between "unnecessary or negligent" destruc-
tion and "necessary or unavoidable" destruction in determining
whether the state's test results will be admissible at trial. 27 The
Kentucky Court of Appeals utilized this distinction in Green v.
Commonwealth.28 In Green, the state entirely consumed a "sin-
well as the calibration samples and results obtained. Id. at 2535. Second, the Court
noted that, in California, drunk-driving suspects may elect to submit urine or blood
samples for testing which are preserved for retesting purposes. Id. at 2535 n.11. (In this
case, the defendants apparently were not informed of these alternatives.)
Despite the limiting language in Trombetta, at least one court has given the decision
effect beyond its literal scope. See Tolen v. State, 477 A.2d 797 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.),
cert. denied, 484 A.2d 274 (Md. 1984), where the court concluded, on the basis of
Trombetta, that since the due process clause does not require that the state preserve
breath samples, "[a] fortiori, the due process clause does not require preservation of
blood samples in order to ... [prosecute] for rape." Id. at 804. In Tolen, the blood
samples, which were routinely destroyed by a hospital, were taken from the victim. They
were not taken for the state's use, nor did they constitute state's evidence at trial. See
id. at 799. The issue raised in Tolen-whether the state should collect potential evidence
to preserve it for the defendant's use-is beyond the scope of this Comment.
21 See, e.g., Deberry v. State, 457 A.2d 744, 752 (Del. 1983) ("discovery under
criminal procedure rules requires lesser showing of materiality than does discovery under
[Brady]") (citing United States v. Felt, 491 F. Supp. 179 (D.D.C. 1979)); State v.
Faraone, 425 A.2d 523, 525 (R.I. 1981) (discovery under SUPER. CT. R. CRRIM. P. 16(a)
"provides for extensive discovery on the part of a defendant in a criminal case going
far beyond the requirements of due process"); State v. Bailey, 475 A.2d at 1049 (VT.
R. Cmum. P. 16(b)(2) "has codified the Brady rule"). See also Love v. State, 441 So. 2d
at 1355 (citing Miss. CoNsT. art. III, § 14); Green v. Commonwealth, 684 S.W.2d 13,
16 (Ky. Ct. App. 1984) (citing Ky. CONST. § 11); State v. Hanson, 278 N.W.2d at 200
(citing S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 2). As the Court noted in Trombetta, "[s]tate courts and
legislatures ... remain free to adopt more rigorous safeguards governing the admissi-
bility of scientific evidence than those imposed by the Federal Constitution." 104 S. Ct.
at 2535 n.12.
" See State v. Herrera, 365 So. 2d 399, 401 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978), cert.
denied, 373 So. 2d 459 (Fla. 1979). See also People v. Taylor, 369 N.E.2d 573, 574 (III.
App. Ct. 1977); State v. Pearson, 678 P.2d 605, 615 (Kan. 1984); State v. Carlson, 267
N.W.2d 170, 175 (Minn. 1978); Poole v. State, 291 So. 2d 723, 725 (Miss.), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 1019 (1974).
11 684 S.W.2d 13 (Ky. Ct. App. 1984).
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gle tablet ' 29 of an alleged drug in the course of its testing. At
trial, the chemist testified that he was following standard testing
procedures, but conceded that consumption of the entire sample
was unnecessary to acquire valid test results.30 The court, noting
that Kentucky does not have a procedural rule governing "pres-
ervation of test materials,"'" held that, in some instances, de-
priving the defendant of his right to test violates constitutional
guarantees .32
Prior to Green, the right to test evidence was confined to
instances where the state had an available sample.3 3 Alterna-
tively, the defendant could inspect reports of the state's test
results,3 4 which are not susceptible of independent evaluation
and therefore have little value to the defense. 3 Although Ken-
tucky has now recognized the importance of the defendant's
" Id. at 15.
' Id.
Id. at 16. Although the court acknowledged that Kentucky lacks a "procedural
rule," it held "the right to [test] is implicit under KY. R. CRI.I. P. 7.24" [hereinafter cited
as RCR]. Id.
11 Specifically, the court found that "rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to
the United States Constitution and Section t1 of the Kentucky Constitution may be
infringed" (Emphasis added). Id. at 15-16. The full holding concludes:
[T]he unnecessary (though unintentional) destruction of the total drug
sample, after the defendant stands charged, renders the test results inad-
missible, unless the defendant is provided a reasonable opportunity to
participate in the testing, or is provided with the notes and other infor-
mation incidental to the testing, sufficient to enable him to obtain his own
expert evaluation.
Id. at 16. The court appears to have confused intentional destruction with suppression.
The destruction of evidence in Green was intentional. It was not, however, accomplished
with the intent to deprive the defendant of evidence. See id. at 15. (Commonwealth's
forensic chemist "conceded that it was not necessary to consume the entire portion" of
the evidence, but "indicated that the entire consumption was caused by the failure of
anyone to advise him otherwise.").
1, See James v. Commonwealth, 482 S.W.2d 92, 94 (Ky. 1972) (defendant entitled
to sample of alleged narcotic when sample available and subsequently introduced at
trial).
See id. at 93-94 (citing RCR 7.24(t)(b)). RCR 7.24(I)(b) provides:
On motion of a defendant the court may . . . permit [the] defendant to
inspect and copy or photograph any relevant . . . results or reports . . . of
scientific tests or experiments made in connection with the particular
case ....
1 See People v. White, 390 N.Y.S.2d 405, 406 (N.Y. 1976) ("defendant was
conspicuously handicapped by his inability to refer to the results of any comparative
testing"); State v. Hanson, 278 N.W.2d 198, 200 (S.D. 1979) (defendant cannot effec-
tively cross-examine State's expert without independent test by expert).
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right to conduct independent tests on evidence, a6 and that the
unnecessary destruction of evidence may violate the defendant's
constitutional rights, 37 Kentucky has failed to similarly protect
the defendant in instances where exhaustion of the total eviden-
tiary sample is necessary. 8
Where unnecessary destruction of test materials has been
held violative of a defendant's constitutional rights, the courts
often rely on sixth amendment or fourteenth amendment due
process analysis.39 Without an independent chemical analysis, the
defendant has no reasonable way of cross-examining the state's
chemist or of challenging the test resultsY° Unnecessary destruc-
tion has been held to constitute an act of suppression 4' and a
denial of due process, thereby denying a defendant access to
relevant and material evidence necessary for the preparation of
his defense. 42 Inherent in these assertions is "the right to know
of adverse evidence and the opportunity to rebut it. "
4
3
The courts recognize that government tests are not infallible.
"[E]xpert opinions as to accuracy and conclusiveness of tests
can and do differ.'1 44 The ability to impeach the results of a
See 482 S.W.2d 92.
" 684 S.W.2d at 16.
,4 See id. See also note 27 supra and accompanying text.
See Warren v. State, 288 So. 2d 826, 830 (Ala. 1973) (right of cross-examination
and due process denied by failure to furnish defendant with a sample); Deberry v. State,
457 A.2d 744, 751-52 (Del. 1983) (duty to preserve evidence rooted in due process clause
of fourteenth amendment); People v. Taylor, 369 N.E.2d at 576 (destruction of evidence
deprived defendant of right to due process and meaningful confrontation); State v.
Brown, 337 N.W.2d 507, 511 (Iowa 1983) (denial of access to evidence may violate due
process); Love v. State, 441 So. 2d 1353, 1356-57 (Miss. 1983) (failure to permit
independent analysis is inconsistent with due process right); State v. Wright, 557 P.2d
1, 7 (Wash. 1976) (en bane) (failure to preserve evidence deprived defendant of due
process). But see United States v. Herndon, 536 F.2d 1027, 1029 (5th Cir. 1976) (sixth
amendment right of confrontation is restricted to witnesses and does not apply to physical
evidence).
, See, e.g., People v. White, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 406; State v. Hanson, 278 N.W.2d
at 200.
4' See Garcia v. District Court, 589 P.2d 924, 929-30 (Colo. 1979) (en banc); State
v. Lovato, 617 P.2d 169, 171 (N.M. Ct. App. 1980).
See 278 N.W.2d at 201.
369 N.E.2d at 575.
Id. The court refers to a nationwide study conducted on 37 crime laboratories
including 135 drug analysts whom the authors concluded, " 'as a group suffer from a
serious lack of specialized training in drug analysis ... [and] are simply not adequately
equipped to solve many drug identification problems.' " Id. (citing Stein, An Evaluation
of Drug Testing Procedures Used by Forensic Laboratories and the Qualifications of
KENTUCKY LAW JouRNAl[
state's chemical analysis is often crucial to defense strategy,
especially when the results constitute the only direct evidence
against a defendant. Despite the courts' pronouncements on
ensuring fundamental fairness, 45 however, the great weight of
authority finds that the state's unavoidable consumption of evi-
dence, through testing, does not violate constitutional guaran-
tees.
46
To justify excluding the state's test results at trial, some
courts require the defendant to prove that total consumption
was unnecessary.47 The defendant, therefore, must offer proof
of the state's culpability-the intentional or negligent destruction
of evidence. 4 Other courts shift this burden to the prosecution
and hold that "a heavy burden devolves upon the State either
to produce a testable sample or to prove by clear and convincing
evidence that the destruction of all of the [evidence] ... was
necessary.' 49 Since the evidence is within the exclusive control
of the state and is consumed by its processes, these courts take
the position that it is more equitable to put the burden on the
prosecution.5 0
Regardless of where the burden of proof lies, when the
admissibility of evidence turns on whether a sample was neces-
sarily or unnecessarily destroyed, a battle of experts at trial may
result. When the quantity of material tested is small, the court
ultimately must determine whether its destruction was necessary.
Moreover, even judges may not agree among themselves on
Their Analysts, 1973 Wis. L. REv. 727, 736 (1973)). See also United States v. Orze-
chowski, 547 F.2d 978 (7th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 906 (1977), where the
government and defense experts disagreed on critical chemical analysis testimony. The
court observed, "[t]he ... informed defense helped educate the Government on what
its laboratory evidence should have been if all doubt was to be resolved about the
identity of substances." Id. at 981.
41 See text accompanying notes 39-43 supra.
'6 See notes 20 & 27 supra and accompanying text.
" See, e.g., Lee v. State, 511 P.2d 1076, 1077 (Alaska 1973); State v. Herrera,
365 So. 2d at 401; State v. Pearson, 678 P.2d at 615; State v. Carlson, 267 N.W.2d at
175; Poole v. State, 291 So. 2d at 726. See also Commonwealth v. Walker, 441 N.E.2d
261, 263 (Mass. App. Ct. 1982) (state's culpability is one factor in considering sanctions).
48 See note 47 supra.
"1 369 N.E.2d at 576. See also 457 A.2d at 753.
0 See 457 A.2d at 753. Accord United States v. Bryant, 439 F.2d 642, 648 (D.C.
Cir. 1971) (noting that "relevant material, much of which, because of imbalance in
investigative resources, will be exclusively in the hands of the Government.").
[Vol. 74
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whether destruction was necessary or unnecessary. 5' In any case,
once the determination is made, some courts will admit the test
results if consumption was necessary and exclude the results if
consumption was unnecessary.12 In these cases, the scope of a
defendant's rights essentially rests upon the culpability of the
state, not upon the defendant's right to fundamental fairness.
Other courts, however, recognize and enforce the defendant's
absolute right to test." When faced with the state's competing
need to exhaust a sample, these courts compromise by allowing
the accused to participate in testing.14 Generally, a defendant
participates by retaining an expert who is present during the
state's analysis." The defendant's expert can thoroughly evaluate
testing procedures, laboratory equipment, chemist skill, integrity
of the sample and, ultimately, the reliability of the results. This
solution preserves any ground for impeachment the defense would
have had by virtue of an independent test.
In some situations, the defendant may be unable to obtain
an expert. Courts have resolved this problem by suggesting al-
ternative methods by which a defendant may "participate.
5 s6
The Green court suggests that disclosing the notes of the state's
expert, in lieu of a sample, may be sufficient for independent
evaluation. 7 This author, however, suggests that a mere report
" See, e.g., People v. Dodsworth, 376 N.E.2d 449 (fll. App. Ct. 1978) (majority
and dissenting opinions reflect disagreement on whether total consumption of an alleged
narcotic was necessary).
"2 See State v. Herrera, 365 So. 2d at 401.
" See People v. Garries, 645 P.2d 1306, 1308 (Colo. 1982).
" See id. at 1309. Accord State v. Wright, 557 P.2d at 7 (Wash. 1976) (en banc).
See, e.g., State v. Cloutier, 302 A.2d 84, 89 (Me. 1973); State v. Faraone, 425
A.2d 523, 526 (R.I. 1981).
" See 645 P.2d at 1309 ("state's analyst might take photographs to preserve the
results of his experiments so that at least an independent interpretation of the result is
possible"). Some courts permit an indigent defendant to hire an expert for independent
testing or to be present during the state's analysis. See State v. Clemons, 363 A.2d 33,
38 (Conn.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 855 (1975) (state should provide access to indigent
defendant when state itself has access and plans to utilize its own expert testimony);
State v. Hanson, 278 N.W.2d at 200. But see Bright v. State, 293 So. 2d 818, 822 (Miss.
1974) (court would not permit an indigent defendant to hire expert for independent
testing at state's expense).
" See Green v. Commonwealth, 684 S.W.2d at 16. The court specifically held that
the notes and other testing information must be "sufficient to enable [defendant] to
obtain his own expert evaluation." (Emphasis added). However, in ruling that the state's
laboratory tests should have been suppressed at trial, the court noted only the state's
failure to produce the laboratory notes. There is no discussion on whether this infor-
mation alone would be adequate for a full independent evaluation. Id.
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of the state's results will rarely, if ever, be capable of independ-
ent evaluation. Detailed notes of the entire test process may
sometimes be an acceptable alternative, but the state's notes
should not be unilaterally offered as a substitute for the defend-
ant's right to test.5 8 The defendant should be given the oppor-
tunity to exercise that right before an evidentiary sample is
entirely exhausted. 9
To fully protect the defendant's right to participate in testing,
the state should give advance notice when it anticipates destruc-
tion of an entire sample.60 Many types of evidence, particularly
body fluids, cannot be preserved indefinitely, and even a timely
motion for disclosure may be too late.6' The state should not
possess the prerogative to destroy evidence, even necessarily,
merely because the defendant has not yet filed a motion for
production under a discovery rule.62 The state's unfettered dis-
cretion creates a risk that the state will consume a sample, or
render the sample incapable of further testing, before the defend-
ant requests disclosure63-a potential result in every instance of
"necessary" destructive testing. If the state is permitted to cir-
"' The Green court inexplicably gives the state its choice. Presumably, the state
may unnecessarily destroy evidence without fear of sanction when the laboratory notes
are made available to the defendant. Id.
" See 645 P.2d at 1309-10.
61 See id.; State v. Wright, 557 P.2d at 7. See also Stipp v. State, 371 So. 2d 712,
714 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979), cert. denied, 383 So. 2d 1203 (Fla. 1980) (better rule is
to notify defendant and allow him to participate in testing); State v. Carlson, 267
N.W.2d at 175 n.4 ("better practice would dictate that the defendant be notified of the
proposed testing"); State v. Kersting, 623 P.2d 1095, 1104 n.4 (Or. Ct. App. 1981)
("Questions concerning deprivation of those rights would be substantially obviated if
the state adopted a procedure to notify the defendant that tests are about to be
conducted.").
61 Where evidence subject to testing consists of bodily substances, such as blood,
it may become incapable of retesting after a period of time due to deterioration, even
though a portion of the sample remains. See, e.g., State v. Pearson, 678 P.2d at 611
(Kan. 1984); State v. Disch, 351 N.W.2d 492, 494-96 (Wis. 1984). Whether a request
was timely may ultimately be another issue interjected at trial. If the defendant is given
notice that the results of a chemical test will be introduced against him at trial, the
"timeliness" issue may be avoided altogether.
62 See United States v. Bryant, 439 F.2d at 651 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Commonwealth
v. Walker, 441 N.E.2d at 263; State v. Bailey, 475 A.2d 1045, 1050 (Vt. 1984).
1' See State v. Herrera, 365 So. 2d at 400 (blood sample destroyed one week after
taken; request made forty days after destruction); State v. Lightle, 502 P.2d 834, 836
(Kan. 1972) (sample consumed by state analysis before information filed); Poole v. State,
291 So. 2d at 724 (state "necessarily" consumed samples of alleged narcotics before
defendants' timely motions for production).
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cumvent the defendant's right to participate in testing by destroy-
ing evidence before a request for disclosure, "the disclosure duty
would be an empty promise."64
The preferred solution is to require advance notice. This
practice has even been recommended by certain courts that do
not recognize a defendant's absolute right to participate in test-
ing. 65 A notice procedure does not create a windfall for the
defendant. If notice is given and a timely request to participate
in testing is not forthcoming, he has "waived" his right and
cannot later complain. 66 The prosecution then will neither be
subject to allegations of intentional suppression or unnecessary
destruction nor face the possibility of having its most probative
evidence rendered inadmissible. The issue of necessary versus
unnecessary destruction will become irrelevant and will not be
interjected at trial. Furthermore, if the defendant has opted not
to participate in testing, it is unlikely that the trier of fact will
draw an inference that the destroyed evidence was somehow
favorable to the accused. 67 A procedure for advance notice serves
the interests of the prosecution, the defense, and the court. It
eliminates both adjudication of collateral issues at trial and
endless appeals on constitutional grounds.
III. PRE-ARREST VS. POST-ARREST DESTRUCTION
The Green court held that the state cannot unnecessarily
destroy evidence "after the defendant stands charged.' '61 The
court ignored countless instances where there is a lapse of time
between a state's testing and an arrest or indictment. The pros-
ecution of narcotics cases often involves extensive and prolonged
undercover operations that result in arrests many months after
- 439 F.2d at 648. Accord 475 A.2d at 1050.
" See 371 So. 2d at 714; 267 N.W.2d at 175 n.4; 623 P.2d at 1104 n.4.
- Cf. Wilhite v. Commonwealth, 574 S.W.2d 304, 306 (Ky. 1978) (defendant
failed to request independent analysis prior to trial pursuant to pretrial order granting
production of sample).
" See Deberry v. State, 457 A.2d at 754 (inference that evidence which defendant
was not allowed to test was favorable to defendant); State v. Herrera, 365 So. 2d at
401 (credibility of state's chemist open to attack when defendant not allowed to test);
557 P.2d at 7.
11 Green v. Commonwealth, 684 S.W.2d 13, 16 (Ky. Ct. App. 1984).
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an alleged offense occurs. 69 When the defendant is eventually
tried, the state's chemical analysis may provide the most incrim-
inating evidence, and be the only basis for conviction.
70
In People v. Taylor,7' cited by the Green court, 72 the Illinois
Court of Appeals addressed the admissibility of test results when
an alleged heroin sample was subjected to destructive testing
before the defendant was charged. 73 The court held that the state
has a duty to preserve part of the evidence "in the event criminal
prosecution is later instituted." 74 Noting that there was no evi-
dence of intentional suppression, the Taylor court held the state's
unnecessary destruction of the entire sample unconstitutional,
reversed the conviction, and excluded the test results on retrial.75
In People v. Garries,76 also cited in Green,7 7 the results of
blood stain tests conducted before the defendant was arrested
were held inadmissible in a murder trial. "The testing procedures
employed have deprived the defendant of important methods of
checking the accuracy of test results on crucial evidence.' '7S In
Garries, the court affirmed the lower court's suppression ruling,
even though total destruction of the evidence was necessary.
79
The Colorado court was highly critical of the government's
failure to notify the suspect and allow him the opportunity to
participate in the testing. 0
61 See. e.g., People v. Taylor, 369 N.E.2d 573, 574 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979) (over four
months elapsed between time of testing and defendant's arrest); Poole v. State, 291 So.
2d 723, 724 (Miss.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1019 (1974) (defendant arrested "some
months" after tests conducted on alleged narcotic sample); State v. Hanson, 278 N.W.2d
198, 199 (S.D. 1979) (five months elapsed between testing and filing of information).
10 See, e.g., Stipp v. State, 371 So. 2d 712, 713 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979), cert.
denied, 383 So. 2d 1203 (Fla. 1980).
" 369 N.E.2d 573 (I1. App. Ct. 1979).
684 S.W.2d at 16.
See 369 N.E.2d at 574.
" Id. at 575. Accord Deberry v. State, 457 A.2d 744, 752 (Del. 1983).
7; 369 N.E.2d at 576.
'6 645 P.2d 1306 (Colo.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 855 (1975).
" 684 S.W.2d at 16.
71 645 P.2d at 1310.
Id. at 1308.
o The court took the state to task, saying:
The state cannot simply present the defendant with an accomplished fact
and then insulate its conduct from review by contending that the defendant
would not have availed himself of the opportunity to participate in the
testing of this admittedly crucial evidence.
Id. at 1310.
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Although the Green court relied on Taylor and Garries," it
limited the application of its holding to instances in which evi-
dence is destroyed after the defendant stands charged.8 2 In other
words, there is no duty to preserve until the duty to disclose
attaches, and only an accused may request disclosure. 83 Some
courts take this view based on their literal interpretation of an
applicable discovery rule. Many state discovery rules are similar
to RCR 7.24(2), which limits the defendant's right to inspect
evidence to materials "in the possession, custody or control of
the Commonwealth. '8 4 Where evidence is destroyed before an
arrest, the evidence is literally no longer "in possession" of the
state when thedefendant is arrested and given the opportunity
to request production. 85 Consequently, the state can freely de-
stroy evidence, even unnecessarily, prior to an arrest, totally
emasculating the purpose of the rule.86
In United States v. Bryant,87 the court vehemently criticized
such reasoning as "far too facile, and clearly self-defeating.
'" 8
Bryant held that the "duty of disclosure attaches ... once the
Government has first gathered and taken possession of the evi-
dence .... [Tihe duty of disclosure is operative as a duty of
preservation." 89 The fact that an investigative agency, as op-
1, See Green v. Commonwealth, 684 S.W.2d at 16. In Green the court noted, "It
is wrong for the state to unnecessarily destroy the most critical inculpatory [sic] evidence
in its case against an accused and then be allowed to introduce essentially irrefutable
testimony of the most damaging nature against the accused." Id. (quoting Stipp v. State,
371 So. 2d at 713). It is unclear from the Stipp opinion whether the alleged narcotic
was destroyed before or after the defendant was charged.
See 684 S.W.2d at 16.
"' This is implicit in the holding. The Green court carefully points out that Taylor
and Garries involved testing prior to the arrest of suspects. See id. at 16. The court
offered no reason for restricting the scope of its holding to those already charged when
the evidence is destroyed.
14 RCr. 7.24(2).
11 See, e.g., State v. Lightle, 502 P.2d 834, 836 (Kan.), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 941
(1972).
- See United States v. Bryant, 439 F.2d 642, 651 n.18.
439 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
Id. at 650.
Id. at 651. Relying on Brady, the court dismissed the argument that "good faith
administrative decisions that certain evidence is not discoverable and thus need not be
preserved" excuse nonpreservation. Id. at 652 n.21. Under Bryant, all discoverable
evidence gathered during a criminal investigation would be subject to the duty of
preservation. Id. Accord Deberry v. State, 457 A.2d at 751-52; People v. Taylor, 369
N.E.2d at 575; Commonwealth v. Walker, 441 N.E.2d 261, 263 (Mass. App. Ct. 1982);
State v. Bailey, 475 A.2d 1045, 1050 (Vt. 1984).
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posed to the prosecution, has possession when the evidence is
destroyed should not exonerate the prosecution.90 If a rule of
preservation attached only to the prosecution, the effectiveness
of the rule would be undermined by the unrestricted actions of
other governmental agencies. 9' As Garries demonstrates, evi-
dence gathered at the investigative stage should not be subjected
to destructive testing without prior notice to the person against
whom the test results will be used. 92
IV. SANCTIONS
The Green93 decision poses one problem that falls squarely
on the prosecution. In Green, highly probative evidence was
excluded because the state breached its duty to preserve an
alleged drug sample-a duty never before imposed.9 4 Future
litigation will undoubtedly produce the same result. To justify
excluding state's evidence, a procedure for "preservation of test
materials" 95 should be adopted that governs all instances of
destructive testing.
9 6
Most courts impose sanctions only when there is a showing
either of bad faith suppression by the state or of prejudice to
the defendant.9 7 A bad faith requirement, however, is inconsist-
o 439 F.2d at 650. The scope of the duty of preservation has been extended by
some courts well beyond evidence within the possession of governmental agencies. See,
e.g., State v. Brown, 337 N.W.2d 507, 510 (Iowa 1983) (state never had possession of
the sample, but police officer "personally directed acquisition of the physical evidence.").
See also State v. Vaster, 659 P.2d 528, 533 (Wash. 1983) (en banc) (duty to preserve
applies to all agents acting under prosecutorial authority, including private citizens).
11 439 F.2d at 650.
92 See People v. Garries, 645 P.2d at 1310.
91 Green v. Commonwealth, 684 S.W.2d 13, 16 (Ky. Ct. App. 1984).
94 Prior to Green, the Kentucky courts had not imposed a duty on the state to
preserve evidence susceptible of destructive testing and the narrow breadth of the holding
in Green leaves the issue open given any change in facts. See, e.g., Scott v. Common-
wealth, No. 84-SC-71-MR (Ky. Nov. 15, 1984), 31 Ky. L. Sutim. 15 at 18 (failure to
preserve corpse not error).
9. 684 S.W.2d at 16 (court acknowledged lack of such a procedural rule in Ken-
tucky).
See, e.g., STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE (2d ed. 1980) at § 11-2.1(b) (iii),
which provides that the prosecution will notify the defendant when scientific tests are
to be conducted which may exhaust the "subject of the test."
' In the federal circuit courts, a balancing test is employed. Although the tests
are not identical, they each weigh the culpability of the government and the prejudice
to the defendant. See, e.g., United States v. Doty, 714 F.2d 761, 764 (8th Cir. 1983);
United States v. Baca, 687 F.2d 1356, 1359 (10th Cir. 1982); United States v. Traylor,
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ent with Brady, where good or bad faith was deemed irrelevant. 9s
The rationale for excluding the evidence is to ensure a fair trial
for the defendant, not to "punish" the prosecution.99 Admit-
tedly, most of the unnecessary destruction cases do not involve
bad faith at all.' °° As in Green, the evidence is consumed not to
deprive the defendant intentionally, "but rather from lack of
sensitivity to defendant's right to perform independent tests."''°
Courts have struggled with various tests to determine if the
defendant has been prejudiced. 10 2 When a sample is consumed
before the defendant can independently conduct testing, the
burden of showing prejudice may be impossible. Recognizing
this dilemma, some courts have held that the defendant is not
required to show actual prejudice'0 3 "because, in the absence of
an independent test, the accused will usually not know whether
the results of the State's test were inaccurate or incorrect."'0
4
Some courts have applied Bryant's broad duty of preserva-
tion to cases in which evidence is unnecessarily consumed:
656 F.2d 1326, 1334-35 (9th Cir. 1981); Virgin Islands v. Testamark, 570 F.2d 1162,
1165-68 (3d Cir. 1978). These courts use a two-part test, weighing governmental bad
faith and prejudice to the defendant. See also United States v. Picariello, 568 F.2d 222,
227 (lst Cir. 1978), and United States v. Herndon, 536 F.2d 1027, 1029 (5th Cir. 1976),
which apply a three-prong analysis: materiality of the nondisclosed evidence, prejudice
to the defendant, and the reasons the evidence is unavailable. Many state courts use a
similar balancing test. See, e.g., Deberry v. State, 457 A.2d 744, 752 (Del. 1983); Lee
v. United States, 385 A.2d 159, 163 (D.C. 1978); State v. Berry, 470 A.2d 881, 885
(N.H. 1983); State v. Lovato, 617 P.2d 169, 171 (N.M. Ct. App. 1980); State v. Bailey,
475 A.2d 1045, 1052 (Vt. 1984); State v. Vaster, 659 P.2d 528, 533 ('Wash. 1983) (en
banc).
See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
" See State v. Wright, 557 P.2d 1, 7 (Wash. 1976) (en banc).
See id. at 6-7; People v. Dodsworth, 376 N.E.2d 449, 452 (Il1. App. Ct. 1978);
People v. Taylor, 369 N.E.2d at 575; Commonwealth v. Walker, 441 N.E.2d 261, 263-
64 (Mass. App. 1982).
People v. Dodsworth, 376 N.E.2d at 452.
, 2 See, e.g., State v. Brown, 337 N.W.2d 507, 511 (Iowa 1983) ("where ... there
is the unavoidable possibility that the [evidence] might have been significantly favorable")
(citing United States v. Bryant, 439 F.2d 642, 648 (D.C. Cir. 1971)); 659 P.2d at 532
(defendant must show only a reasonable possibility that evidence was material and
favorable); 475 A.2d at 1050 (defendant must show only a reasonable possibility that
evidence was material and favorable). See also 617 P.2d at 171 (defendant must show
materiality and prejudice from suppression of evidence).
",' See, e.g., 337 N.W.2d at 511. Accord State v. Amundson, 230 N.W.2d 775,
788 (Wis. 1975) (inability to show prejudice alone will not defeat claim that destruction
deprived defendant of due process).
1, 376 N.E.2d at 451.
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[S]anctions for non-disclosure based on loss of evidence will
be invoked in the future unless the Government can show it
has promulgated, enforced and attempted in good faith to
follow rigorous and systematic procedures designed to preserve
all discoverable evidence gathered in the course of a criminal
investigation. '0s
Such a standard, plus a procedure which provides the accused-
or potential accused-advance notice when the state anticipates
the need to consume evidence, more appropriately defines the
scope of the state's duty while protecting a defendant's discovery
rights. These procedures will neither conduce to fishing expedi-
tions nor inhibit the state's ability to evaluate evidence thor-
oughly. The procedures limit the duty of preservation to
discoverable evidence.
In Kentucky, "discoverable" evidence is defined under RCR
7.24(2) as "evidence that may be material to the preparation of
[the] defense." After notice is given to the defendant that de-
structive testing will be conducted, the burden lies with the
defense to show materiality.'0 6 Courts disagree on what consti-
tutes "material" evidence. 0 7 Most states, however, limit "dis-
coverable" evidence to either evidence introduced at trial by the
prosecution or evidence obtained from or belonging to the
defendant.'10 The prosecution's intent to offer the evidence at
"I United States v. Bryant, 439 F.2d at 652. See State v. Bailey, 475 A.2d at 1050;
State v. Wright, 557 P.2d at 6; Deberry v. State, 457 A.2d at 752; State v. BrovM, 337
N.W.2d at 509. See also State v. Vaster, 659 P.2d at 533 ("[In determining the
appropriate sanction, a court should consider procedures established for preserving
evidence.").
11 See RCr 7.24(2).
I'l See, e.g., Levin v. Katzenbach, 363 F.2d 287, 291 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (Material
evidence is that which "might have led the jury to entertain a reasonable doubt about
[defendant's] guilt."); Curran v. Delaware, 259 F.2d 707, 711 (3d Cir. 1958), cert.
denied, 358 U.S. 948 (1959) (Material evidence comprises "pertinent facts relating to
defense.").
" See, e.g., ALA. R. CRIM. P. 18.1(c)(2)-(3); ALAsiA CRui. RULE 16; ARKc. R.
CRIM. P. 17.1(a)(v); CoLo. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(v); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-86a(a)
(West supp. 1983); FLA. R. CR, . P. 3.220(a)(l)(vi) & (xi); IDAHo C.R. 16(b)(4); IL.
Sup. CT. RULE 412(a)(v); IOWA R. CItn. P. 13.2.b(I); MD. RULE 4-263(b)(5) & (6);
MINN. R. CRIM. P. 9.01 § 1(3); Miss. R. Cluti. P. 25.03(A)(6); MONT. CODE ANN. §
46-15-302(1)-(3)(a); N.J. RuLEs Cams. PRACTIcE 3:13-3(a)(1); N.M.R. CIu. P. 27(a)(3);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-903(d) (Michie 1983); N.D.R. Cami. P. 16(a)(1)(C) (Supp. 1983);
Omo Cmi. R. 16(B3)(I)(c); R.I. SUrPER. R. Cpami. P. 16(a)(4); S.D.R. CRui. P. 16(a)(l)(C);
TENN. R. CRIM. P. 16(l)(C); VT. R. CR. P. 16(a)(2)(D). Delaware, Nevada, Pennsylvania
and Virginia each have discovery provisions similar to RCR 7.24.
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trial should provide a sufficient showing of materiality. 0 9 Where
the state intends to destroy evidence, and it is unsure of its
materiality, advance notice will fully protect both parties." 0
The test results should be inadmissible if the state fails to
comply with these procedures. "Supression of relevant evidence
is indeed lamentable, but the answer lies in the systematic insti-
tution of safeguards ... rather than the approval of unfair
procedures.""' Limiting sanctions to instances in which there is
actual proof that the destroyed evidence was exculpatory places
an often insurmountable burden on the defendant." 2 If only
"bad faith" suppression is penalized, the state has no incentive
to adopt effective procedures to preserve evidence." 3
CONCLUSION
Green v. Commonwealth"4 creates important discovery rights
for criminal defendants in Kentucky. As the court conceded,
however, Kentucky has no procedure governing the preservation
of test materials." 5 Until such a procedure is adopted, the Ken-
tucky courts, like other courts, will undoubtedly struggle with
each new set of facts that involves pretrial discovery of evidence
subjected to destructive testing." 6 The guidelines suggested herein
are capable of broad application and represent the interests of
both prosecution and defense. Unlike Green, these guidelines
decide neither a defendant's discovery rights nor the state's duty
to preserve according to a sample's quantity or time of seizure.
They do, however, promote the fundamental objective, recently
" See C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CRIMINAL 2D § 254, at 69
(1982).
See 557 P.2d at 7.
People v. Garries, 645 P.2d 1306, 1310. But see STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL
JUSTICE § 11-4.7(a) (2d ed., 1980) and its commentary which cautions that exclusion of
state's evidence may result in a windfall to a guilty defendant.
" See notes 102-104 supra; 337 N.W.2d at 510 ("JI]t would be unfair to require
the defense to show favorableness when it is impossible to determine the nature of the
evidence.").
See 557 P.2d at 7.
684 S.W.2d 13 (Ky. Ct. App. 1984).
"' Id. at 16. See note 31 supra.
"' See, e.g., Scott v. Commonwealth, 685 S.W.2d 184 (Ky- 1984) (failure to preserve
murder victim's corpse after defendant's motion to conduct independent examination held
not error where there was no suggestion of bad faith on the part of the prosecution).
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reiterated by the United States Supreme Court, of affording
criminal defendants "a meaningful opportunity to present a
complete defense."" 7
Judith K. Jones
"7 California v. Trombetta, 104 S. Ct. 2528, 2532 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concur-
ring).
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